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Abstract 
 
 
This article analyses direct forms of the 'protection of civilians' (PoC) in UN 
peacekeeping, and how this links to aspirations outlined by cosmopolitan scholarship 
at the turn of the 20th century. It's main contention is that cosmopolitan conceptions of 
peacekeeping, which advocate more active forms of civilian protection, have faced 
significant challenges in the UN peacekeeping system.  These challenges (internal and 
external) are a result of the state-based nature of the UN, and its peacekeeping practice. 
Therefore, the UN’s flexibility to adopt ethical practices associated with protection of 
civilians can only be contained within confined boundaries.  
 
The article takes as its starting point the aspirations of cosmopolitan scholarship before 
outlining policy development in UN peacekeeping concerning PoC. It then explores 
internal and external challenges faced in operationalizing PoC in UN peacekeeping 
practice before arguing that the UN may be at a stage where it is ‘muddling through’ in 
terms of PoC. The article contributes to debates about the role of peacekeeping in global 
politics, through seeking to understand the possible limits of cosmopolitanism within 
peacekeeping practice. Moreover, it offers a contemporary understanding of where the 
United Nations has developed protection of civilians in its deployments and what 
challenges remain. 
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Muddling on through? Cosmopolitan peacekeeping and the protection of civilians 
 
Introduction 
 
A decade after the concept of ‘cosmopolitan peacekeeping’ was introduced1, this paper 
looks to reflect on how peacekeeping operations undertaken by the UN – or at least 
their military components – reflect the desires of cosmopolitan scholarship that 
peacekeeping operations can be utilised to protect vulnerable citizens in areas of 
deployment from violence. It takes as its starting point debates at the turn of the century 
on the role of peacekeeping in global politics in the light of Kofi Annan’s 1999 call to 
‘think anew’ about how the UN responds to violent conflict, and picks up specifically 
on the development of the linkages between peacekeeping, the protection of civilians 
(PoC) in violent conflict, and cosmopolitan scholarship.  
 
At the core of this re-evaluation is the longer standing debate as to how peacekeeping 
fits between more state-centred approaches to international affairs, and the extent to 
which it has progressed as a ‘muted expression of international cooperation’2. In 
particular it looks at the progression of cosmopolitan minded approaches to 
peacekeeping, and the extent to which this progress has been checked by a 
peacekeeping system which has at its core in the words of Norrie MacQueen a purpose 
‘to stabilize an international system that, more than four centuries after the treaty of 
Westphalia, still has as its basic unit the sovereign, territorial state’3.  
                                                          
1 Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, ‘Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping’  
2 Pugh, ‘Peacekeeping and IR Theory’ p.106 
3 MacQueen, Peacekeeping and the International System, p.246 
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The article is framed around the concept of ‘cosmopolitan peacekeeping’, as posited by 
Tom Woodhouse and Oliver Ramsbotham in 2005.Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (who, 
along with Hugh Miall outlined a broader cosmopolitan framework for conflict 
resolution), argued that cosmopolitan peacekeeping should be brought to the forefront 
of debates over the role of peacekeeping in global politics. In their view, the 
cosmopolitan agenda offers a framework for the development of peacekeeping 
operations, as it ‘identifies a post-Westphalian direction for international politics, which 
transcends the state-centricity of peacekeeping’, as well as offering a consistent way of 
applying international humanitarian standards, in particular the duty to protect civilians, 
through a ‘consistent rationalization, legitimation and operationalization of concepts of 
human security’4. At its core, cosmopolitan peacekeeping is intended to achieve two 
goals. Firstly, operations would have the capacity ‘to address the injunction to protect 
civilians from violent conflict’; and secondly, that missions would address the ‘positive 
peace dimension’ of the human security agenda5.  
 
Woodhouse and Ramsbotham however saw significant challenges in achieving the goal 
of protecting civilians. Although the UN was establishing mechanisms which would 
mean that attacks on civilian populations would constitute a threat to international peace 
and security6, ‘the potential demands on the duty to protect overwhelms the capacity of 
the UN to act’7. In their view, peacekeeping was underpowered to protect civilians.  
 
                                                          
4 Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, ‘Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping’, p.141 
5 Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, ‘Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping’, p.140 
6 UN Security Council Resolution 1296 (S/RES/1296) 
7 Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, ‘Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping’, p143 
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On that basis, the article examines UN attempts made to empower peacekeeping 
operations to protect civilians from violent conflict. In order to do this, the article will 
first look more broadly at the linkages made between peacekeeping and cosmopolitan 
ethics, outlining where scholarship from a cosmopolitan field advocated policy changes 
in UN peacekeeping operations, and where peacekeeping operations developed policy 
which could be seen as suggesting a cosmopolitan commitment to vulnerable civilians. 
The second section of the article outlines developments in UN peacekeeping that have 
occurred in the area of PoC mandates, guidance and training. The third section explores 
external and internal pressures which have placed pressure on this commitment. These 
pressures relate to the state-based nature of peacekeeping practice and governance. 
Finally, the paper offers an overview of where these pressures have left the UN in terms 
of operationalizing cosmopolitan commitments, arguing that the organisation is 
currently ‘muddling through’ with regards to PoC. In its conclusion, the paper discusses 
the sustainability of an approach based on muddling through, and whether a 
cosmopolitan and state-centred approach can ever be reconciled in the practice of UN 
peacekeeping. UN peacekeeping has never been trouble free, but a review of its 
progress is essential insofar as the activity has been described as being in a ‘quagmire’8. 
 
Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping 
 
This paper takes as it's starting point the early 2000’s, a period characterised by Kofi 
Annan’s call from to ‘think anew’ about peacekeeping operations9, and subsequent 
debates amongst observers, policymakers and academics as to where peacekeeping 
                                                          
8 Gowan, ‘Happy Birthday, UN’ 
9 United Nations, Secretary-General presents his annual report to General Assembly (Press Release 
SG/SM/7136), New York, United Nations, 1999 
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could be situated in a framework of global politics10. From the cosmopolitan field, this 
period characterised a growth in scholarship that focussed on the ethical concern for 
vulnerable non-citizens, and the role that military forms of peacekeeping could play in 
acting on such concerns. This came of the back of a wider exploration of cosmopolitan 
democracy, and the linking of cosmopolitan democracy to moral approaches which 
prioritise the ‘vital needs of all human beings11’. Woodhouse and Ramsbotham referred 
to this literature in their contribution, highlighting work from David Held and Mary 
Kaldor when developing their thinking. David Held outlined a pressing need for 
cosmopolitan institutions to uphold a ‘global responsibility actively to protect 
individuals from being deprived of their rights and to aid them when protection has 
failed’. This was at the core of what was described as a cosmopolitan democratic 
project, where ‘we live in a world where we must come to enjoy multiple citizenships’, 
and local, national and international institutions work to ‘reflect the multiplicity of 
issues, questions and problems which affect and bind people together irrespective of 
whether they are in one nation-state or another’12.  The role of operationalizing this was 
explored by Mary Kaldor, who argued that responses to ‘new wars’ need to be based 
on an ‘alliance between international organisations and local advocates of 
cosmopolitanism’. ‘Just as warring factions depend on outside support’ she argued, ‘so 
there needs to be a conscious strategy of building on local cosmopolitan initiatives’13. 
This in turn would impact on the tasks asked of military personnel, who would have to 
mix traditional tasks (such as separating belligerents, maintaining ceasefires, and 
controlling airspace), with new tasks (the protection of safety zones and relief 
corridors), and tasks close to ‘traditional policing tasks (ensuring freedom of 
                                                          
10 See for instance: International Peacekeeping, Vol.11, No.1, Spring 2004 
11 Held, ‘Cosmopolitanism, Democracy’, p.164 
12 Held, ‘How to Rule the World’. P.28; Held, Democracy and the Global Order 
13 Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p.122 
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movement, guaranteeing the safety of individuals, especially returned refugees or 
displaced persons, and the capture of war criminals14).  
 
The role of military personnel in a cosmopolitan framework formed the basis of work 
by Cheeseman and Elliot, who explored the idea that militaries can, or should, be used 
to ‘defend the moral community of humankind’ as well as defending ‘territorially 
bounded political communities’15. The authors found that this framework would alter 
military structures and tasks, pointing out that militaries could soon be required to 
‘become the security guarantors for the whole process of civil reconciliation and 
reconstruction’16. In turn, the roles of militaries themselves would be altered. If 
cosmopolitan forces were to be created, they would have to be ‘detached as much as is 
possible from statist and great power purposes’ thereby being ‘qualitatively and 
materially different from traditional  militaries in their identity and value structures’. 
Because of this, Cheeseman and Elliot argued that the use of cosmopolitan force  must 
be conducted under the authority of ‘broadly-based international institutions’17. Here 
the United Nations was . identified as a ‘legitimate’ source of peacekeeping, with a 
Charter that ‘resounds in cosmopolitan values’18. Exploring the role of the UN in the 
deployment of cosmopolitan force, Marrack Goulding argued that the UN’s 
peacekeeping activities ‘can include military tasks which are wholly or partly 
cosmopolitan in nature’, with such activities, involving coercive action against a 
government or illegal regime ‘for reasons that are at least partly cosmopolitan’, 
protection of humanitarian and civilian operations, guarding vital institutions, 
                                                          
14 Kaldor, New and Old Wars, p.125 
15 Elliot and Cheeseman, ‘Introduction’, p.4  
16 Elliot and Cheeseman, ‘Introduction’, p.4 
17 Elliot, ‘Cosmopolitan Ethics and Militaries’, p.24 
18 Cheeseman and Elliot, ‘Conclusion’, p.278 
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threatened communities, prominent personalities, using force to uphold human rights, 
and demining activities19.   Influencing these wider approaches were developments in 
UN policy towards civilian protection. Firstly, in 1999 and 2000 the UN Security 
Council adopted two ‘Cross-Cutting Resolutions’ dealing specifically with threats to 
civilian populations during internal conflict. The cross cutting nature of these 
resolutions would mean that all future peacekeeping operations would incorporate them 
into their mandates, and that the targeting of civilian populations, and the ‘committing 
of systematic, flagrant and widespread violations of international humanitarian and 
human rights law’ may constitute a threat to international peace and security20, thus 
giving the Security Council reason to invoke Chapter VII of the UN Charter.  
 
Secondly, broader approaches to civilian protection were linked to the development of 
the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P). The 2009 Secretary-General’s report, 
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, outlined a three-pillared approach that 
would form the R2P doctrine. The third of these three pillars articulates the 
‘responsibility of Member States to respond collectively in a timely and decisive 
manner’ when a state is manifestly failing to protect its own population21, but noted that 
the UN ‘is still far from developing the kind of rapid-response military capacity most 
needed to handle the sort of rapidly unfolding atrocity crimes’22. It therefore encouraged 
‘further creative thinking about such an option’, with the assurance that UN officials 
will carefully review it23. For some, enhanced models of UN peacekeeping were well 
positioned to fit into this gap24.  
                                                          
19 Goulding, ‘Cosmopolitan Purposes and the United Nations’, p.108 
20UN Security Council Resolution 1296 (S/RES/1296) 
21 UN, Implementing the responsibility to protect, p.8-9  
22 UN, Implementing the responsibility to protect: p.27 
23 UN, Implementing the responsibility to protect, p.18 
24 World Federalist Movement/Global Action to Prevent War, UNEPS Backgrounder 
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Thirdly, policy developments were also seen on a regional context. The development 
of the African Union’s Peace and Security Architecture and African Standby Force 
offered an ‘early indication’ of cosmopolitan arrangements in peacekeeping25. The plan 
for the ASF would be to create five regional standby brigades of 3000-4000 personnel, 
designed for intervention into a range of peacekeeping-related tasks at short notice. 
Additionally, the European Union looked to develop a security policy based on human 
security, with the 2004 Barcelona Report, and 2007 Madrid Report. These reports 
advocated that the EU should move from the defence of borders towards contributing 
‘to the protection of every individual human being’, proposed a 15,000 strong ‘Human 
Security Response Force’26, with an approach that involved the use of robust military 
force27, combined with nuanced forms of integration between civilian and military 
actors.  
 
Thus a groundswell of opinion was posited by cosmopolitan scholars that the UN’s 
ability to pick itself up from the failures of peacekeeping in the 1990s with the added 
focus on PoC. What followed was a series of policy developments in UN approaches 
towards protecting civilians, which further institutionalised the notion that 
peacekeeping operations should have the capacities to further protect civilians in violent 
conflict. 
 
Developments in UN Peacekeeping 
 
                                                          
25 Curran and Woodhouse, ‘Cosmopolitan Peacekeeping’ p. 1065 
26 Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, p.19 
27 Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, A European Way of Security, p10 
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The institutionalisation of PoC has been most notable in mission mandates, policy 
guidance from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), and new training 
frameworks for uniformed personnel.  
 
Mandates 
Beginning with the UN’s passing of cross-cutting resolutions on the issue (outlined 
above), PoC has gained significant traction in peacekeeping mandates, being ‘invoked 
regularly […] to justify giving strong Chapter VII coercive mandates’ to operations28. 
This mainstreaming of PoC in policy documents and operations’ mandates has arguably 
had the effect of ‘placing the UN at the forefront of debates and policy development in 
this regard’29. The UN Security Council has issued mandates incorporating the 
requirement to protect civilians to 13 peacekeeping operations to date, including nine 
ongoing missions. This means that 95% of deployed personnel working under mandates 
which contain PoC30.  
 
To take two examples, PoC has developed from being an implied goal to a fundamental 
pillar of mission mandates. Under Chapter VII of the UN charter, UNSCR 2149 (2014), 
which establishes the MISCA peacekeeping operation in the Central African Republic, 
places the protection of civilians as the first priority task of the new operation31. 
Additionally, in early 2014, the UN Mission in South Sudan  (UNMISS), underwent a 
mandate review which has streamlined the operation to focus on four main tasks: 
protection of civilians; monitoring and investigating human rights; creating enabling 
                                                          
28 Breaky, et al,  Enhancing Protection Capacity: pV 
29 Tardy, ‘The Dangerous Liaisons’, p. 427 
30 Statement by Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous to the Special Committee on Peacekeeping 
Operations, 24 February 2014 
31 UN Security Council Resolution 2149 (S/RES/2149) 
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conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; and supporting the 
implementation of the cessation of hostilities agreement32. This exercise has been seen 
as a ‘significant departure’ from the previous mandate for UNMISS. The previous 
mandate which included several statebuilding tasks was unsustainable considering 
Security Council felt that ‘UNMISS cannot support a government that has been accused 
of serious human rights violations’33.  
 
DPKO Guidance: 
With mandates developing, guidance has followed. The 2010 Draft DPKO/DFS 
Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations offered a systematic three-tiered approach to PoC, and aimed to tackle ad 
hoc approaches to PoC across missions and the resulting lack of ‘clear vision’ on how 
to implement the activity: 
 
• Tier 1: Protection through political process: This refers to the ‘mission’s 
overarching mandate to support the implementation of a peace agreement, or an 
existing political process’. The concept note argues that a solid political process 
should be centred on protecting civilians, and that a society without violations 
on the civilian population has better chance of consolidating peace. 
• Tier 2: Providing protection from physical violence: This ‘involves protecting 
civilians from physical violence, which includes any of the mission’s efforts to 
prevent, deter, and if necessary, respond to situations in which civilians are 
under the threat of physical violence’. This tier primarily involves 
                                                          
32 UN Security Council Resolution 2155 (S/RES/2155) 
33 Security Council Report, Adoption of Resolution on UN Mission in South Sudan 
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predominantly military assets, used to respond to ‘rapidly unfolding 
circumstances. Tier two is based around four phases: assurance and prevention; 
pre-emption; response; consolidation.  
• Tier 3: Establishing a protective environment: The third tier focusses on the 
development of peacebuilding processes, and focusses on ‘supporting the 
establishment of an environment that enhances the safety and supports the rights 
of civilians’34. 
 
This has recently been supplemented with the Implementing Guidelines for Military 
Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions, a series of guidelines aimed at 
personnel at strategic, operational and tactical levels, focussing on the ‘physical 
protection of civilians against violence in any form.’35 At a strategic level, the 
guidelines look towards centralising PoC in planning, considerations over force 
composition and disposition, and the Concept of Operations. At the operational level 
(Force Commander Level), the role of PoC in operational planning, orders and 
coordination is outlined, as is the role of human rights reporting, risk mitigation, 
monitoring and evaluation of results, in-mission training, and ‘expectation 
management’. It is in this section where the DPKO has looked to outline a strong stance 
on the role of military personnel reacting to potential threats to the civilian population. 
Operational level guidance covers rules of engagement, and ‘operational 
accountability’, the latter arguing that failure to act in circumstances warranting the use 
of ‘all necessary means’ (despite the ROE and mandate allowing such action) ‘may 
amount to insubordination’36.  
                                                          
34 UN, Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians 
35 UN, Implementing Guidelines for Military Components, p2 
36 UN, Implementing Guidelines for Military Components, p.10 
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At a tactical level, the guidance looks deeper into ‘Tier Two activities, and outlines 
advice on the conduct of PoC tasks. This includes presence and posture, reporting, 
adherence to Rules of Engagement, early warning, and engaging communities, with the 
last of these outlining the wider non-enforcement mechanisms that military personnel 
can use (such as community liaison and communication skills). The guidelines outline 
the importance of training, both at pre-deployment, and in-mission37, stating that in 
mission training includes local cultural sensitivities, early warning indicators, and 
gender dynamics, as well as incorporating mission specific scenario-based simulation 
38. 
 
Training for Uniformed Personnel 
To promote the aforementioned guidelines, the DPKO has produced Specialised 
Training Materials (STMs) on the Protection of Civilians, which aim to provide 
personnel with shared understanding of the UNs approach to PoC. It is hoped that this 
shared understanding ensures that operations ‘can tackle their protection functions 
accordingly’39. The STMs are split into six modules, five of which cover the following 
topic areas: 
 
• Overview of the Protection of Civilians 
• International Legal Dimensions of the Protection of Civilians 
• Protection of Civilians concept in the context of United Nations 
Peacekeeping operations 
                                                          
37 UN, Implementing Guidelines for Military Components p.6 
38 UN, Implementing Guidelines for Military Components p.11 
39 UN, Preface: Specialized training materials on protection of civilians, p.3 
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• Ensuring the protection of civilians 
• Prevention and response to conflict-related sexual violence 
 
The sixth module is comprised of twelve scenario-based exercises (based in the 
fictitious country of Carana40) which provides a ‘broad range’ of possible situations that 
might confront a UN peacekeeping mission charged with PoC41. 
 
With these policy changes in mind, academic attention has increasingly been paid to 
the role of civilian protection in peacekeeping operations, with quantitative studies 
being particularly useful in highlight the extent to which peacekeeping operations have 
been able to protect civilians. What these studies show is that the developments in 
mandates, training, and guidance have an impact on the ability of UN missions to 
protect civilians. Although Murdie and Davies identify that the mere presence of a 
peacekeeping operation may not have an automatically positive impact on human rights 
situations in a country, they suggest that if the peacekeeping operation includes a 
‘formal humanitarian purpose’, which focuses ‘specifically to the conditions of citizens 
in the conflict-prone state’, the chances are that it will improve the human rights 
situation in the state42. When a peacekeeping operation attempts to undertake mediation 
and information sharing with key protagonists, this again improves the human rights 
situation in the host state43.   
 
                                                          
40 UN, Module 6: Carana, New York, United Nations, P11 
41 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, STM 6: Instructor Guidance Notes on the Scenario- 
based Exercises (SBE), New York, United Nations, 2011, p.2 
42 Murdie and Davis, ‘Problematic Potential’, p.58 
43 Murdie and Davis, ‘Problematic Potential’, p.68 
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Lisa Hultman’s statistical analysis of peacekeeping and attacks on civilians outlines 
that if undertaken incorrectly, international responses to atrocities by rebel groups can 
unintentionally lead to an increase in attacks against civilians. Such interventions can 
lead to belligerents targeting civilians in a last minute attempt to gain territorial control, 
increased violence as a strategy of one belligerent group imposing costs on its 
adversary, and increased violence as part of economic criminal activity44. However, 
Hultman finds that if missions are deployed with mandates to protect civilians, rebel 
violence is actually reduced. This means that  
 
whereas missions with clear mandates can help reduce violence and enhance the 
prospects for peace, simply sending troops without the mandate to interfere 
when necessary can be devastating45. 
  
Hultman’s work in this regard has further identified that if adequately composed of 
military troops and police, peacekeeping operations ‘are effective at stifling anti-
civilian violence and saving innocent lives46. In a wider quantitative study of 
peacekeeping capacities to protect civilians, Hultman (along with Jacob Kathman, and 
Megan Shannon) finds that the level of commitment of troops and police has an effect 
on civilian protection, namely that the more police/troops deployed on peacekeeping 
operations, the higher the likelihood that violence against civilians decreases47. This, 
the authors argue, means that there is ‘reason for optimism regarding peacekeeping as 
a tool for civilian protection’48.  
                                                          
44 Hultman, ‘Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence?’, p..30 
45 Lisa Hultman, ‘Keeping Peace or Spurring Violence?’, p.42 
46 Hultman, Kathman, Shannon, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection’, p.888 
47 Hultman, Kathman, Shannon, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection’, p.879-880 
48 Hultman, Kathman, Shannon, ‘United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection’, p.888 
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Challenges to PoC 
 
While the developments outlined above have promoted the surge of cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping for greater civilian protection in operations, Significant challenges 
prevail. These challenges – identified as being external and internal – both point to the 
significant challenge of peacekeeping operations being a state-based activity.  
 
External challenges 
On an external level, consent of the host state has been a consistent challenge, 
particularly when state forces target civilians. In peacekeeping operations, the level of 
consent at the state level – or strategic-level consent – is critical to the success of the 
mission. This is outlined in current UN peacekeeping ‘doctrine’ (UN Peacekeeping 
Operations: Principles and Guidelines) whose definition of peacekeeping - a 
‘technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has been 
halted, and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the peacemakers’ 49 - is 
heavily reliant on ‘strategic level’ consent of the ‘main parties’ involved in the conflict. 
The absence of consent of the main parties, in the view of the UN, means that the 
operation ‘risks becoming a party to the conflict and being drawn towards enforcement 
action, and away from its intrinsic role of keeping the peace’50. State consent is an 
absolute but not a determining requirement. Operational experience has taught the UN 
that a blind reliance on state consent may lead a peacekeeping force to lose not only 
effectiveness but also legitimacy – that there may be those at an operational level who 
may not consent to the peace process or the activities of peacekeepers, and resort to 
                                                          
49 UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, p.18 
50 UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, p.31-32 
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violence against the peacekeepers to demonstrate this (referred to ‘spoilers’ in the 
Principles and Guidelines51). Here, the UN distinguishes between consent from the 
main parties (described above) and ‘tactical level consent’. In order to safeguard 
strategic consent, peacekeeping operations deployed with PoC mandates follow the 
three-tiered approach outlined above52. These three areas are meant to complement each 
other, and to an extent provide a political safety net - to ensure that the UN will not 
create a parallel structure alongside a government, thus maintaining consent for an 
operation.  
 
Nevertheless, in particular deployments, operational demands have overtaken planning, 
leading to the jettisoning of this safety net. Returning to the United Nations Mission in 
South Sudan, the mission was originally created to assist in statebuilding tasks. 
However, throughout 2014, increasing insecurity led to outbreaks of violence in the 
country, with the government itself becoming one of the belligerent groups53. This has 
had notable impacts on the mission, with over 70,000 civilians seeking refuge in UN 
bases54. This led to armed actors attacking the UN bases, leading, in December 2014, 
to the death of two Indian peacekeepers, who were killed whilst carrying out direct 
civilian protection activities at a UN base in Jonglei State55. The reaction by the UN 
Security Council was to reinforce the UNMISS operation with 5500 troops and 440 
police56. As a result, the mandate for the operation was realigned to one which protects 
civilians purely through offering direct protection - guarding bases where civilians are 
                                                          
51 UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Principles and Guidelines, p34 
52 UN, Draft DPKO/DFS Operational Concept on the Protection of Civilians  
53 International Crisis Group, South Sudan: A Civil War by Any Other Name, p.6-7 
54 UN News Centre, Ban, Security Council welcome South Sudan ceasefire 
55 Oakford, ‘UN Peacekeepers Overwhelmed in South Sudan’ 
56 UN Department of Public Information, Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2132 (2013), Security 
Council Increases United Nations Mission’s Military Presence In South Sudan,  
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sheltering57. Briefing, the UN Security Council, head of the DPKO Herve Lasdous 
openly acknowledged that the UNMISS operation has removed any capacity building 
to the South Sudanese government, and was focusing purely on the impartial protection 
of civilians58.  
 
This action has created challenges for approaches to tactical level consent, and possibly 
to strategic level consent. At a tactical level, deterrence alone is not infinite, and this 
presents considerable difficulties where civilian protection mandates are concerned. 
Analysis during the time of the UNMISS realignment reflected this by outlining three 
possible scenarios for the force: 
 
In the first and best scenario, the mission will manage to hold together militarily 
long enough for more-or-less sincere political talks to end the violence. In the 
second, it might muddle through in the face of half-hearted negotiations and 
spasmodic but serious violence, trying to save as many lives as possible. The 
third, worst-case scenario would involve the fragmentation and rout of 
UNMISS after repeated attacks on its bases, personnel and convoys59. 
 
This difficulty has been exacerbated as one of the major protagonists in the conflict is 
the government itself. As seen, the UNMISS mandate has sought to disassociate the 
mission from supporting capacity building in the government, principally due to the 
government’s role in the violence. Again, this may be laudable, but when taking into 
account the three-pronged strategy of PoC, the UNMISS operation has arguably 
                                                          
57 Inter-Press Service, U.N. Peacekeeping Goes on the Offensive,  
58 UN Department of Public Information, United Nations Mission in South Sudan to suspend current 
activities,  
59 Gowan, ‘Diplomatic Fallout’ 
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removed its own safety net, and set itself up as a parallel structure within the state. This 
has significant implications, particularly on issues of strategic consent. Such 
implications are not only theoretical: in March 2014, the UN itself reported that the 
UNMISS operation was targeted by the host government. The UN’s report, found that 
the government of South Sudan had violated previous agreements made with UNMISS, 
and ‘have beaten U.N. personnel and relief workers, forcibly searched their vehicles, 
and organized public demonstrations demonizing the world body as an enemy of the 
fledgling African nation’60.  
 
Whereas UNMISS has seen the mission move away from a belligerent state, the UN 
has experienced difficulties when operations support national governments who 
themselves are abusers of human rights. Increasingly, UN peacekeeping operations 
have been linked to an emergent ‘stabilization’ approach. Though yet to be clarified in 
UN policy and guidance61, a raft of UN missions have appeared with ‘stabilization’ in 
their title62. The mandates of such missions, according to De Coning, ‘task them to 
protect a government against an insurgency or identified aggressors; and that they are 
tasked to undertake robust operations, including offensive operations63’. These 
missions also resonate with a concept of stabilization operations shared amongst NATO 
member states, (and non-NATO states with experience of deployment in Iraq and 
Afghanistan), which focuses on ‘a combination of civilian and military approaches with 
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62 MINUSTAH: Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilization en Haïti (2004–); MONUSCO: 
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a focus on re-establishing state authority in ‘failed states’; this includes provision of 
‘legitimate’ state authority, institution-building, and delivery of key state services’64.   
 
Arguably the danger of such close alliances with host governments, without strategic 
and operational guidance means that a UN system that encourages processes of 
democratization and good governance, has unwittingly become involved in ‘complex 
local political alliances and patronage systems’, in a range of post-conflict 
environments. This problem has been exacerbated by the UN’s focus on supporting 
‘strong men and women’ to lead ‘strong institutions’ in these societies. This has 
arguably led to  ‘strategic weakness’ in a number of UN operations, where the UN is 
‘entangled in fractious and arguably unethical relationships with national leaders who, 
driven by greed or fear, have little real interest in stable, open and inclusive political 
systems’65. With UN policymakers fearing the catastrophic effects of withdrawing from 
countries where the government is known to abuse human rights, missions tend to stay, 
with the hope that strong leaders are shepherded to less hardline approaches. This 
invariably brings further challenges to missions, which (at least in the case of the 
MONUSCO operation in the DRC) have worked alongside state forces which contain 
alleged war criminals 66.  
 
Internal Difficulties:  
Internally, the governance of peacekeeping is predominantly a state-based process, with 
states sat on the General Assembly and Security Council outlining their perspective on 
peacekeeping, and how the activity should be undertaken. This becomes problematic, 
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as there is considerable debate over concepts underpinning peacekeeping operations, 
and their applicability to modern day operations.  
 
Amongst member states in the UN, and supporting policy guidance, there is an broadly 
accepted approach that peacekeeping operations are based on three core principles: 
consent of the parties to the conflict; impartiality of the peacekeeping force; and 
minimum use of force (apart from in self defence, and defence of the mandate)67. These 
principles have historical significance – they have been in existence since the first UN 
peacekeeping missions – and are to many what sets UN ‘blue helmet’ peacekeeping 
apart from other forms of interventions.  
 
However, the impact of declining consent from those states who host UN peacekeeping 
– particularly where PoC is involved – has led to difficulty. In June 2014 the Russian 
Mission to the UN lead a thematic debate entitled ‘United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: New Trends’. The concept paper for the debate notes a growing concern 
from the Russian Mission that the gap between the underlying principles of 
peacekeeping, and the practice of peacekeeping is growing68. Additionally, statements 
from South and Central Asian Troop Contributing Countries, who for the past ten years 
have borne the brunt of UN peacekeeping operations, have set the tone for more 
skepticism towards heavy PoC. Pakistani Ambassador, Masood Khan, made clear the 
Pakistani position that protecting civilians is the priority of the host nation (supported 
by the peacekeeping mission), and that ‘there should be no misplaced expectations from 
                                                          
67 See, for instance statements to the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th Meeting of the 68th Session of the General 
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68 UN, Letter dated 1 June 2014 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the 
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the Missions’, as they ‘cannot provide protection to all the civilians all the time’69. 
Likewise, a study on Indian approaches to peacekeeping notes that it ‘has not been 
comfortable’ with increasing activism in this area, in particular when peacekeeping is 
‘employed for humanitarian concerns under the “Responsibility to Protect.”’70.  
 
This last point explains why in 2012 the UN Secretary General clearly stated that 
‘consent based and non-coercive’ peacekeeping operations do not fall under ‘Pillar 
Three’ of the R2P. This distinction was partly a result of pressure from troop-
contributing countries for a clear distinction to be made between consent-based 
peacekeeping operations and interventions under the R2P, which may not require the 
consent of the host government71. Importantly, the Secretary-General argued that 
“[w]hile the work of peacekeepers may contribute to the achievement of RtoP goals, 
the two concepts of the responsibility to protect and the protection of civilians have 
separate and distinct prerequisites and objectives”72.  
 
Consequences are also being felt on other areas of peacekeeping policy, particularly 
areas of peacekeeping that have been subject to longer processes of negotiation, such 
as levels of troop reimbursement for peacekeepers. The Contingent-Owned Equipment 
Working Group is the committee designed to forge a pathway through the issues of how 
peacekeepers are reimbursed for undertaking their duties. When operations are 
deployed into operating environments which ‘significant, additional hardship’, member 
states can expect compensation through adjustment to standard reimbursement rates. 
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The four identified areas are ‘Environmental, Operational Intensity, Hostile 
Action/Forced Abandonment, and Potential hostile engagement’. Additionally, in 
recent discussions within the UN’s Senior Advisory Group on Rates of Reimbursement 
to Troop Contributing Countries, a ‘risk premium’ has been placed under discussion, 
which is effectively an additional financial incentive for units to deploy without 
restrictions or caveats, and are recognized as ‘having “acquitted themselves well despite 
exceptional levels of risk.”’73 
 
Deployment into ongoing conflict with mandates to protect civilians, under a robust 
mandate, possibly against the wishes of the state, therefore brings a considerable 
financial effect on the peacekeeping system74. Moreover, regarding the increase in 
equipment costs, contingents deploying into areas where conflict is ongoing often have 
to ensure that they have adequate equipment to protect themselves. Troop and 
equipment costs becomes more pronounced when the major financial contributors are 
seeking to keep costs low within UN operations, a fact reflected by the head of the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Herve Ladsous, who stated that ‘Flexibility 
and innovation at Headquarters and within our missions is no longer an option, but an 
acute necessity’75  
 
This divergence between those who undertake the peacekeeping (who want better 
financing), and those who create operations (who wish to see better value for money) 
links to the final area where the peacekeeping system could be stretched, and that is in 
the relationship between the UN Security Council - which has a minority of troop 
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contributing states on it - and the General assembly - with a much larger number of 
troop contributors. This has been outlined in the UN’s recent High Level Report on 
Peace Operations, which state that the lack of effective ‘triangular cooperation’ 
between the secretariat, Security Council, and TCCs ‘has generated frustration on all 
sides, and has impacted mandate implementation76’ Significant diversions in 
peacekeeping policy have also been criticized for their apparent lack of consultation. 
Questions were raised when the UN Security Council passed Resolution 2098, which 
authorized the establishment of the MONUSCO Force Intervention Brigade, to carry 
out ‘targeted operations to “neutralize and disarm” the notorious 23 March Movement 
(M23), and other Congolese rebels and foreign armed groups’ in the east of the DRC. 
The FIB, comprised of three infantry battalions, artillery, Special Forces and 
reconnaissance, was created as part of a wider drive by MONUSCO to ‘proactively 
protect civilians’. However, the seemingly small timescale for debate amongst member 
states brought significant criticism from the Permanent Representative of Argentina: 
 
I reiterate that we believe that we are facing a conceptual change of the 
traditional understanding of peacekeeping operations. The inclusion of a peace-
enforcement dimension in the concept of peacekeeping, even when justified 
under the circumstances, requires in-depth consideration and responsible action. 
Faced with that challenge, I emphasize that more than one week of negotiations 
would have been needed so that all the concerns of the members of the Council 
could have been reasonably addressed,77. 
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Statements such as this also highlight the role of state-interest in the UN’s decision 
making bodies. The apparent ‘steamrollering’ of initiatives such as the FIB links to 
studies which highlight the monopolization of decision-making by the permanent five 
on the Security Council78, often to the cost of UN peacekeeping itself79.  
 
These internal pressures bring into question the extent to which UN peacekeeping can 
achieve the goals of civilian protection. The internal debates are inextricably interlinked 
with the external pressures outlined previously that cause member states in New York 
to question the appropriate direction of UN peacekeeping. 
 
The current response: Muddling on through? 
 
The policy dilemma therefore is that the UN has developed capacities in its ability to 
undertake PoC tasks in peacekeeping operations, but not developed enough to 
undertake missions solely based on the Protection of Civilians. The situation is 
therefore one of ‘muddling through’, where opportunities are taken where possible, but 
wider issues are left unaddressed. This becomes problematic when there are missions 
deployed which are PoC-heavy deployments, regardless of the range of interpretations 
of what can and should be attempted by the wider UN membership. This is 
demonstrated in the UN’s own reflections on how peacekeeping operations deal with 
PoC.  
  
In 2014, the UN’s Office for Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) produced a report 
entitled ‘Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection of civilians 
                                                          
78 Cunliffe, Legions of Peace,  p.225 
79 Durch, ‘Supporting Peace’, p.45 
 27 
mandates in United Nations peacekeeping operations’. The report sought to examine 
how UN peacekeepers operating under PoC mandates interpreted the mandates, and 
importantly for this discussion, the extent to which force was used as a mechanism to 
protect civilians when under attack. Importantly, the OIOS report highlighted a 
significant shortfall in peacekeepers’ actions. Through examining Secretary General’s 
Reports from 2010 to 201380, the report outlined that of the 507 incidents reported in 
the time period, only 20 per cent (101 incidents) were reported to have attracted an 
‘immediate mission response’.81.  
 
The report went on to state that where missions were deployed ‘on site’ at the time of 
an attack or threatened attack, force was ‘almost never used’. Instead, peacekeeping 
forces used a range of non-violent tactics to protect civilians.  That peacekeepers use a 
wider range of tools at their disposal than the use of force demonstrates that there are 
wider tools to achieving civilian protection. This was the main thrust of the response 
by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, who argued that by focusing on 
‘one element of military action’, the report ‘devalues the importance of political 
solutions’ undertaken by peacekeeping operations in their protection activities82. 
However, it also indicates that although the UN Security Council is becoming more 
active in authorizing robust peacekeeping which has PoC components, there is less such 
activity in deployed missions. This mismatch was highlighted by the OIOS, which 
stated that 
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civilians mandates, p.7-8 
82 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, ‘Annex I’, p.26 
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Where Security Council intent is unclear (or, as one senior mission official put 
it, “skimpy on the detail”), mission leaders as well as contingents within the 
same mission can interpret mandates differently. Some contingents were 
reportedly more willing to use force than others83 
 
When considering the quantitative work on peacekeeping (outlined above) this is 
problematic, particularly when there is an emerging body of literature which argues for 
missions to be better equipped – both conceptually with mandates, and physically with 
resources – if they wish to achieve improved civilian protection. Additionally, it leads 
to two considerable problems for missions. Firstly in the expectations of what missions 
can and cannot achieve, and secondly the possibility of peacekeepers unwittingly 
sidestepping a legal requirement to use force to protect civilians. 
 
The OIOS noted that high expectations are placed on missions with PoC, particularly 
if the Security Council continues to authorize missions to use force – up to and 
including deadly force – to protect civilians. Missions can therefore be ‘reasonably be 
expected’ to provide protection to vulnerable populations. When missions fail to 
provide such protection, civilians ‘are often highly critical of the mission’s 
performance’. The OIOS put this criticism in the context of the use of other measures 
(mentioned above), stating that ‘Successes in prevention do not, in the opinion of 
civilians, offset failures to intervene when they are under attack.84’. For instance, a 
Foreign Policy investigation 85 into United Nations/African Union hybrid operation in 
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Darfur explored the mission’s (in)ability to protect civilians in the Darfur. The 
investigation highlights a myriad of issues which have impeded the operation in 
protecting Darfuris from attacks perpetrated by government-backed militias, even 
though the operation is backed by a Chapter VII mandate covering the Protection of 
Civilians86. 
  
Security Council mandates authorizing the use of force also creates a legal requirement 
to ‘do so within their capabilities when civilians are in imminent physical danger or 
actually being attacked in their areas of deployment87’. However, from interviews with 
mission staff, the OIOS reported that there was less understanding of the legal 
requirements pertaining to PoC activities when a state is unable or unwilling to 
discharge their primary responsibility to protect civilians. Moreover, the OIOS reported 
that mission staff felt that the use of force would be ‘unrealistic’ if it was against the 
host state. This, the OIOS reported, ‘recognizes operational and political constraints, 
but is at odds with the legal authority and mandate to act88’.  
 
Muddling through does not provide a sustainable base for the development of PoC. 
Regardless of training, guidance, and mandating, consent and sovereignty will always 
win out in the peacekeeping system. This may happen on an internal level, where 
member states will become increasingly resistant to significant change in the 
peacekeeping system (pushback concerning the R2P is indicative of this). This could 
also happen on an external level, when strategic level consent to a UN mission is lost. 
                                                          
86 UN Security Council Resolution 1769 (S/RES/1769) 
87 UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection 
of civilians mandates, p.7 
88 UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, Evaluation of the implementation and results of protection 
of civilians mandates, p.15 
 30 
Warnings regarding the UNMISS operation made in 2014 indicate this, as does more 
recent assessments of the UN’s links with host governments who themselves are 
abusers. Muddling through may also mean that missions are susceptible to being used 
and abused by states on the P5. As Hugo Slim has recently argued, the ‘very fact that 
all power tends to want to adopt humanitarian discourse indicates the very real strategic 
significance of the idea and its language’. If, in Slim’s view, one is to claim to be acting 
in a humanitarian context, they can ‘earn for themselves an extraordinary allure – even, 
paradoxically, when the claim to be humanitarian is made from the very act of being 
violent89. Arguably, the debates over the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC speak 
to this.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This raises important questions about the shape and direction of cosmopolitan 
peacekeeping. Firstly what speed do we expect change to happen at UN level? For 
Woodhouse and Ramsbotham, they take the longer view. Whilst noting that the state-
based and militarized system of the UN, they outline another level of international 
organisation, the ‘international community’, where states recognise a degree of 
international collectivity beyond the state. This is not a homogeneous entity and that 
the UN system is a hybrid and constantly evolving system, they suggest longer-term 
evolution towards cosmopolitan goals90. Muddling through therefore could be a stage 
in a wider re-envisioning of peacekeeping, and international conflict management. 
However, what if cosmopolitan peacekeeping has reached its boundaries in the UN? 
Woodhouse and Ramsbotham argued that cosmopolitan approaches can provide a 
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policy ‘bridge’ between solidarist approaches to the UN and the more transformative 
approaches from the critical theory field: in some ways they were right with 
developments being made in policy which moved peacekeeping towards a more 
cosmopolitan footing. Yet, limitations are apparent, something picked up more recently 
by cosmopolitan scholars. David Held has recently made the point that collective and 
collaborative action is ‘something that the nations of the world have not been good at’91, 
and whilst academic discourse around cosmopolitanism has been ‘unexpectedly 
successful’, ‘efforts to obtain a democratic transformation of world politics have 
achieved very modest results so far’92. In order to interrogate whether there has been an 
evolution (or transformation) of states’ interests towards more cosmopolitan ends, more 
research is needed into how states approach issues of protection in UN fora. Here, 
approaches to understanding the development of ‘stabilisation’ discourse in the UN 
Security Council may provide an indication as to how this could be done93. 
 
A juncture can thus be identified, with three possible forms of future development 
(though it should be noted that each pathway is not exclusive from the others). Firstly 
is an approach which accepts that ‘muddling through’ is part of the norm in 
peacekeeping, and to continue ‘baby-steps’ of policy development at tactical levels. 
This would achieve noted policy developments, but with the constant threat that a 
disaster is never far away. The OIOS report testifies to this, outlining that for all of the 
tactical developments, the UN Security Council’s mandating of PoC for missions in 
areas of low consent does not often equate to robust action. Secondly, is to build on 
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existing understanding that places PoC in a wider context than just in the UN. This 
accepts that UN peacekeeping, identified as the ‘Swiss army knife’ of international 
conflict management94 has unassailable limitations in this field. Taking this path would 
arguably make the role of UN peacekeeping operations more complimentary to those 
who have alternative, more civilian-led approaches to civilian protection, and would 
possible mean the UN steps back from tricky deployments. It is also possible that if 
there were to be a disaster in PoC (see the warning about UNMISS above), this pathway 
may be more likely. The third, more cosmopolitan minded, approach would be to seek 
to strengthen international arrangements to protect civilians. This would include further 
investigation and advocacy of the possibility of reform at the global level of 
peacekeeping decision-making, ranging from analysis of the behavior of key states in 
UN fora, to reform initiatives designed to enhance UN Security Council working 
methods. From what this article has argued, this global level democratization has thus 
far been almost impossible. Nevertheless, it is essential that those engaged with 
cosmopolitan approaches to conflict management seek for ways in which change can 
be achieved.  If this is abandoned, the hard-won smaller scale policy developments will 
be akin to shifting deckchairs on the titanic.  
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